UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-24-2012

State v. Fortin Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38069

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Fortin Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38069" (2012). Not Reported. 61.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/61

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID.Ai"H,,,:,A------,
STATE OF IDAHO,

COPY

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

NO. 38069

)

vs.

)
)
)
CODY JAMES FORTIN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE PATRICK H. OWEN
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

GREG S. SILVEY
Silvey Law Office, ltd.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 565
Star, Idaho 83669
(208) 286-7400

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................ iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..........................................................................1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings .................................... 1
ISSUES ............................................................................................................4
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................5
I.

IL

Ill.

Fortin Has Failed To Show The District Court
Abused Its Discretion In Admitting Evidence Of Fight ................ 5
A.

Introduction ...................................................................... 5

B.

Standard Of Review .........................................................6

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its
Discretion To Admit Evidence Of Fortin's
Flight From Police ............................................................6

Fortin Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused
Its Discretion In Excluding Potential Defense Witness
Candice Waters ........................................................................ 12
A.

Introduction .................................................................... 12

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 12

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its
Discretion In Declining To Allow Potential
Defense Witness Candice Waters To Testify ................. 13

D.

Any Error In Excluding Waters' Testimony
Was Harmless ............................................................... 17

Fortin Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred
In Denying His Motion For A Mistrial ....................................... 18

IV.

A.

Introduction ................................................................... 18

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 19

C.

The District Court Did Not Err In Denying
Fortin's Motion For A Mistrial ......................................... 19

Fortin Has Failed To Show That There Was
More Than One Preserved Error To Cumulate ....................... 23

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................23
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ........................................................................23

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 16 P.3d 288 (Ct. App. 2000) .................... 17, 19
State v. Birkla, 126 Idaho 498,887 P.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1994) .............................. 12
State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187,646 P.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1982) .......................... 22
Statev. Cootz, 110 Idaho 807,718 P.2d 1245 (Ct. App. 1986) ........................ 6, 8
Statev. Cross, 132 Idaho 667,978 P.2d 227 (1999) ........................................... 6
State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 264 P.3d 975 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................ 11
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009) .............................................. 6
State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 752 P.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1988) .............................. 16
State v. Jeffers, 661 P.2d 1105 (Ariz. 1983) ......................................................... 7
State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 803 P .2d 528 (1990) .................................... 23
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,965 P.2d 174 (1998) ....................................... 7, 8
Statev. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459,235 P.3d 409 (Ct. App. 2010) ........................ 7
State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 864 P.2d 596 (1993) ............................... 12
State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818,215 P.3d 538 (Ct. App. 2009) .......... 6, 7, 8, 11

RULES
I.R.E. 401 .................................................................................................... 7, 8, 13
I.R.E. 403 ............................................................................................... 11, 12, 16
I.R.E. 404(b) .............................................................................................. passim
I.R.E. 611(a) ...................................................................................................... 16

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cody James Fortin appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon
the jury verdict finding riim guilty of aggravated battery and the deadly weapon
sentencing enhancement.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Late at night, Cody Fortin, Darryl Shaylor, and several other individuals
gathered at a Boise house.

(5/17/10 Tr., p.2, L.7 - p.7, L.19.)

Fortin began

arguing with one of the people in the house, and pointed at and "challenged"
several others. (5/17/10 Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.9, L.10.) When Shaylor stood up to
respond to Fortin, Fortin swung at Shaylor, and a fight ensued. (5/17/10 Tr., p.9,
L.11 - p.11, L.2.)

On the floor of the living room of the residence, Fortin bit

Shaylor and tried to gouge his eyes.

(5/17/10 Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.11, L.22.)

Shaylor responded with bites and punches.

(5/17/10 Tr., p.11, L.16 - p.12,

L.13.) Shaylor then escaped the house, and laid down in the front yard. (5/17/10
Tr., p.12, Ls.16-21.) At this point, Shaylor realized he was bleeding and seriously
injured. (5/17/10 Tr., p.12, L.18 - p.13, L.21.) Fortin followed Shaylor outside,
approached, cut Shaylor's face with a knife, and fled the scene.

(5/17/10 Tr.,

p.17, L.24 - p.19, L.B.)
The first responding officer noted a large laceration on the right side of
Shaylor's face, from which Shaylor was bleeding profusely. (5/18/10 Tr., p.130,
Ls.16-23.) Shaylor had coagulated blood in his hair, and was wearing a tank top
1

that was covered in blood. (Id.) The officer lifted Shaylor's shirt to reveal a pool
of blood surrounding his upper torso. (5/18/10 Tr., p.131, Ls.4-22.) Fortin was
transported to the hospital, was designated as a Level 1 trauma patient, and was
treated by a trauma surgeon.

(5/18/10 Tr., p.156, L.20 - p.175, L.12.)

The

surgeon identified a deep, four-inch penetrating wound between the chest and
shoulder, near the neck, consistent with a knife wound, and a large laceration on
the side of his face.

(5/18/10 Tr., p.168, L.10 - p.171, L.19.)

Shaylor had

extremely low blood pressure, was in Class IV hemorrhagic shock, and had lost a
significant amount of blood, but eventually recovered after emergency surgery.
(5/18/10Tr., p.162, L.9-p.175, L.12.)
A warrant was issued for Fortin's arrest. (5/19/10 Tr., p.39, Ls.5-10.) The
day after the stabbing, officers located and surrounded Fortin outside of a
Meridian residence. (5/18/10 Tr., p.208, Ls.5-11; 5/19/10 Tr., p.39, L.2 - p.41,
L.11.)

The officers were in undercover vehicles, and were wearing civilian

clothing, but they displayed police badges, identified themselves as police
officers, utilized the patrol lights on their undercover vehicles, and told Fortin he
was under arrest. (5/19/10 Tr., p.41, L.12- p.47, L.19.) Fortin fled in his vehicle.
(5/19/10 Tr., p.50, Ls.7-14.) Officers pursued him for approximately eight and
one-half miles.

(5/19/10 Tr., p.52, Ls.13-16.)

During the pursuit, Fortin hit a

police officer with his vehicle, sideswiped another vehicle, and eventually
crashed his own vehicle. (5/18/10 Tr., p.208, L.23 - p.209, L.23.) Fortin then
fled on foot into a wooded area, over a fence, and then into a ditch. (5/19/10 Tr.,
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p.53, L.18 - p.54, L.5.)

Eventually, officers sent in a police K-9, and Fortin

surrendered. (5/18/10 Tr., p.209, Ls.2-17.)
The state charged Fortin with aggravated battery, the deadly weapon
sentencing enhancement, felony eluding, and aggravated battery on a law
enforcement officer. (UPSI, pp.4-5; R., pp.22-23; 5/18/10 Tr., p.209, Ls.18-23,
p.210, Ls.20-22.)

The state tried the aggravated battery and deadly weapon

sentencing enhancement separately from the felony eluding and aggravated
battery on a law enforcement officer charges.

(R., pp.22-23; see generally

5/17/10 Tr.; 5/18/10 Tr.; 5/19/10 Tr.)
The jury found Fortin guilty of aggravated battery and the deadly weapon
sentencing enhancement. 1 (R., p.69.) The district court sentenced Fortin to 12
years fixed and 13 years indeterminate. (R., pp.79-82.)

Fortin timely appealed.

(R., pp.83-86.)

1

The felony eluding and aggravated battery on a law enforcement charges were
still pending at the time of Fortin's convictions for aggravated battery and the
deadly weapon sentencing enhancement. (UPSI, pp.4-5.)
3

ISSUES
Fortin states the issues on appeal as:
1.

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED
EVIDENCE OF MR. FORTI N'S FLIGHT

BY

ADMITTING

2.

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO
ALLOW THE DEFENSE TO CALL A WITNESS

3.

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL

4.

WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR
REQUIRES REVERSAL

(Appellant's brief, p.5 (capitalization in original).)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Fortin failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of his flight from police?

2.

Has Fortin failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
excluding potential defense witness Candice Waters?

3.

Has Fortin failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion for a
mistrial?

4.

Has Fortin failed to show that there was more than one preserved error to
cumulate?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Fortin Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Admitting
Evidence Of Fight
A.

Introduction
Fortin contends the district court abused its discretion by admitting

evidence that Fortin fled from police.

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-14.) Specifically,

Fortin contends the district court erred by failing to recognize that evidence of
flight was subject to I.R.E. 404(b), and by failing to perform the proper analysis in
considering the admissibility of this evidence. (Id.)
However, while the district court did not specifically recognize the
applicability of l.R.E. 404(b) on the record, Fortin has failed to show that the trial
court abused its discretion in ultimately admitting the evidence. The state
provided sufficient pretrial notice of its intent to present the evidence. The trial
court properly analyzed the relevancy of the evidence.

Further, while the trial

court did not expressly discuss, on the record, whether the probative value of the
evidence was substantially outweighed by any potential for unfair prejudice, the
record indicates that the district court conducted such an analysis, and discussed
the matter with the parties in chambers. In any event, the evidence of Fortin's
flight was substantially probative of his consciousness of guilt, and Fortin has not
identified any unfair prejudice to weigh against the probative value of the
evidence.

5

B.

Standard Of Review
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard:

whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d
1185, 1187 (2009).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Admit Evidence Of
Fortin's Flight From Police
Evidence of crimes or other acts bearing on a defendant's character is not

admissible to show that the defendant acted in conformity therewith in committing
a crime. I.R.E. 404(b). However, evidence of such crimes or acts is admissible
if: (a) it is relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant's character, and
(b) its probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by
the probability of unfair prejudice associated with character. I.R.E. 404(b); State
v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999).
A defendant's escape or flight is one of the exceptions to the general rule
prohibiting evidence of prior bad acts or crimes. State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho
818,821,215 P.3d 538, 541 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Gootz, 110 Idaho
807, 814, 718 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Ct. App. 1986)). Evidence of escape or flight
may be admissible because it may indicate a consciousness of guilt. Rossignol,
147 fdaho at 821,215 P.3d at 541.

6

Admission of evidence which is probative on the issue of flight to avoid
prosecution requires the trial court to conduct a two-part analysis.

kl at 822, 214

P.3d at 542. The trial court must determine that the evidence is relevant under
I.RE. 401, and then must determine that the probative value of the evidence is
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ll;l Evidence is
not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a defendant's case.
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an improper basis.
State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459,465, 235 P.3d 409, 415 (Ct. App. 2010); State
v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998).
While the inference of guilt from a defendant's flight may be weakened
when a defendant harbors motives for escape other than guilt of the charged
offense, the "existence of alternative reasons for the escape goes to the weight
of the evidence and not to its admissibility." Rossignol, 147 Idaho at 822, 215
P.3d at 542 (citing State v. Jeffers, 661 P.2d 1105, 1116 (Ariz. 1983)).
Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to utilize I.RE. 404(b)
evidence that Fortin had fled from officers who approached him and informed him
he was under arrest.

(R, pp.30-31.)

Fortin objected to the admission of this

evidence. (5/18/10 Tr., p.206, L.6 - p.207, L.7.) Prior to the start of the trial, the
district court and the parties discussed the issue "at some length" in chambers.
(5/18/10 Tr., p.220, Ls.7-11.)

During the second day of trial, before the state

presented the flight evidence to the jury, the parties discussed the matter on the
record outside the presence of the jury. (5/18/10 Tr., p.194, L.18-p.229, L.14.)
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At that time, the state clarified that it did not intend to introduce evidence
that Fortin used his vehicle to strike a police officer and sideswipe another
vehicle, or evidence of how fast Fortin was traveling while fleeing the police.
(5/18/10 Tr., p.209, L.18 - p.210, L.4.)

The trial court further excluded, as

irrelevant, evidence emphasizing the officers' response to Fortin's flight, including
that the officers utilized a police K-9 to assist in extracting Fortin from the ditch.
(5/18/10 Tr., p.225, L.2 - p.229, L.6.)

Subject to these exclusions, the district

court permitted the state to introduce evidence of Fortin's flight.

(5/18/10 Tr.,

p.228, L.16 - p.229, L.6.) Fortin does not challenge the district court's relevancy
determinations on appeal.
While the district court recognized that evidence of a defendant's flight
from

prosecution

is

generally

admissible

for

the

purpose

of

showing

consciousness of guilt, it indicated that it "didn't think it was a[n) [I.R.E.J 404(b)
problem." 2 (5/18/10 Tr., p.222, Ls.15-22.)

Fortin contends that the district court's

failure to recognize flight as I.R.E. 404(b) evidence prevented the court from
conducting the second prong of the flight evidence analysis - determining

2

The concept of defendant flight evidence as being relevant to show
consciousness of guilt is so ingrained in Idaho law that the Idaho appellate courts
typically discuss the admissibility of such evidence without specific reference to
I.R.E. 404(b) (Rossignol, 147 Idaho at 821-823, 215 P.3d at 541-543; Gootz, 110
Idaho at 814-815, 718 P.2d at 1252-1253; Moore, 131 Idaho at 819-820, 965
P.2d at 179-180). Instead, the Courts proceed directly to the two-part test for
admissibility of flight evidence - whether the evidence is relevant under I.R. E.
401, and whether the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In light of the existence of this test,
specific reference to or identification of I.R.E. 404(b) is inconsequential.
8

whether the probative value of the evidence of flight was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-14.)
Fortin's argument fails for two reasons.

First, comments by the district

court and prosecutor indicate that the district court did consider the probative
value of the evidence in relation to the danger of unfair prejudice, and verbalized
this analysis in chambers in the presence of the parties prior to the trial. Fortin
thus cannot meet his burden of showing that the district court erred in failing to
perform this analysis. Second, regardless of whether the district court expressly
verbalized its analysis and conclusion regarding the second prong of the flight
evidence admissibility analysis, the evidence was substantially probative of
consciousness of guilt, and Fortin failed to identify any unfair prejudice to weigh.
Fortin can therefore not show that the district court abused its discretion by
ultimately admitting the evidence.
Prior to ruling that evidence of Fortin's flight was admissible, the district
court noted that the court and the parties had discussed the issue "at some
length" in chambers before the trial began, and that the court indicated to the
parties at that time that it was inclined to rule that the flight evidence was
admissible.

(5/18/10 Tr., p.220, L. 7 - p.222, L.1.)

The state referenced this

pretrial discussion while arguing in favor of the admissibility of the flight evidence.
(5/18/10 Tr., p.219, L.1 - p.220, L.6.) The prosecutor stated:
As I pointed out yesterday, I think [the flight evidence] falls squarely
under the rules, I think it is 104, the Idaho Rule of Evidence states
that evidence that is relevant comes in unless it is otherwise
excluded by a rule. This could potentially be excluded by 403 as
well as 404(b). And I have filed this motion so that we have notice
9

under 404(b). And so that is not an issue of notice, it is just an
issue for the Court to decide how relevant and how much the
prejudicial effect is.

And certainly in this case, when the events are so closely - it
happens one day later and they are serving the arrest warrant on
this case when he flees from them the following day. So I think it is
highly relevant.
As far as whether it is prejudicial, the Court pointed out, and
I agree, it is prejudicial but it is not unfair prejudice. It is not that
they are going to think he did it for the wrong - for some bad
reason or something unrelated. It is prejudicial because he was
running from officers and shows his consciousness of guilt.

(5/18/10 Tr., p.219, L.1 - p.220, L.6 (emphasis added).)
The state thus not only argued that the flight evidence had no potential for
unfair prejudice, it indicated that the district court expressed its agreement in the
pretrial chambers meeting on the issue.

Neither the district court nor Fortin

contradicted the prosecutor's version of events.

At the pretrial chambers

meeting, the court advised Fortin that, though it was inclined to admit the
testimony, it would consider any subsequent authority or argument presented by
Fortin. (5/18/10 Tr., p.220, Ls.12-17.) Fortin did not produce any such authority
or argument (5/18/10 Tr., p.220, Ls.18-23), and did not otherwise argue below
that the district court failed to perform the second prong of the flight evidence
analysis.

Fortin cannot show that the district court failed to conduct a proper

analysis in admitting the flight evidence.
In any event, the flight evidence was clearly probative of Fortin's
consciousness of guilt, and Fortin has failed to identify any unfair prejudice from
10

the evidence. Recently, in State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, _, 264 P.3d 975,
977 (Ct. App. 2011 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that even where a district
court fails to specifically address, on the record, whether the probative value of
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice as part of
an I .R.E. 403 analysis, an appellant must still identify some actual unfair
prejudice to weigh in order to show reversible error.
In the present case, Fortin has not specifically identified any "unfair
prejudice" from the flight evidence.

(Appellant's brief, pp.12-14.)

Fortin did

contend, in the context of arguing that the state's evidence did not even implicate
flight, that there were potential motives for his escape other than guilt of the
aggravated battery offense - specifically, that Fortin may not have realized that
the men who approached and pursued him were police officers, and might have
instead thought that they were civilians seeking revenge on behalf of Shaylor for
the incident the night before. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-9; 5/18/10 Tr., p.214, L.24p.215, L.20.)
Even if Fortin had specifically identified these alternative motives as
creating the potential for unfair prejudice, the "existence of alternative reasons for
the escape goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility."
Rossignol, 147 Idaho at 821, 215 P.3d at 541. Since such "alternative reasons"
do not go to the admissibility of flight evidence, it follows that they also do not
constitute "unfair prejudice" within the meaning of the I.R.E. 404(b) flight
evidence admissibility analysis. Fortin was entitled to argue that Fortin's flight did
not exhibit consciousness of guilt, and that he had alternative reasons for fleeing,
11

and he in fact did so during closing argument. (5/19/10 Tr., p.155, L.22 - p.156,
L.20.)

Fortin, however, has failed to identify any unfair prejudice from the

evidence.
Fortin has failed to show the district court performed an incorrect analysis
in evaluating the admissibility of the evidence of Fortin's flight, and in any event,
cannot show that the probative value of the evidence was substantially
outweighed by any potential for unfair prejudice. Therefore, Fortin has failed to
show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.

Il.
Fortin Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Excluding
Potential Defense Witness Candice Waters

A

Introduction
Fortin contends the district court abused its discretion in declining to allow

potential defense witness Candice Waters to testify. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-21.)
However, Fortin's claim fails because the record reveals that the court acted well
within its discretion in determining that Waters' testimony would have been
cumulative and irrelevant.

B.

Standard Of Review
The relevancy of evidence is an issue of law subject to free review.

v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993). A district court's
decision to exclude evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 403 will be disturbed on appeal
only if the appellant demonstrates that the district court abused its discretion
State v. Birk/a, 126 Idaho 498, 500, 887 P.2d 43, 45 (Ct. App. 1994).
12

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Declining To Allow
Potential Defense Witness Candice Waters To Testify
Evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to make more or less likely any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. I.R.E. 401. Idaho
Rule of Evidence 403 gives the district court discretion to exclude even relevant
evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by, among other
things, considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
At trial, after the state rested, Fortin's counsel informed the court that
Fortin would not be testifying, and that he would not be calling any witnesses.
· (5/19/10 Tr., p.93, Ls.7-23; p.97, L.5 - p.99, L.9.) However, before the defense
formally rested, the district court took a break in the proceedings to settle the jury
instructions. (5/19/10 Tr., p.99, Ls.10-14.)
When the parties returned from the break, Fortin's defense counsel
informed the court that Candice Waters, who was present at the Boise residence
during the stabbing but was not called as a witness, informed him during the
break that earlier, she had overheard state witnesses Darryl Shaylor and Kasey
Smith discussing their trial testimony after they had both testified. (5/19/10 Tr.,
p.101, L.16 - p.104, L.12.) Waters also told Fortin's defense counsel that she
had had lunch with Shaylor earlier in the week, after Shaylor had testified.
(5/19/10 Tr., p.103, Ls.19-24.) These acts, asserted Fortin, were in violation of
the district court's admonishment to witnesses not to discuss their testimony.
(5/19/10 Tr., p.104, Ls.1-8.)
13

The district court questioned Fortin's attorney as to the harm of such
discussions, considering that Waters had not testified, and Shaylor and Smith
had already testified at the time of the alleged discussions. (5/19/10 Tr., p.102,
L7 - p.113, L. 17.) Fortin's counsel insisted that Waters had been tainted as a
potential witness, though he did not offer any specific basis for any "taint." (Id.)
Then, despite having informed the court, just minutes earlier, that the defense
would not be calling any witnesses, Fortin attempted to call the now "tainted"
Waters. (5/19/10 Tr., p.102, L. 17 - p.110, L.2.) The state objected, arguing that
Fortin was "trying to do an end around of getting this testimony in front of the jury,
for no other reason than of getting it in there when it's been no fact of
consequence," and "trying to cause the problem by putting a witness on that's
already spoke to a witness." (5/19/10 Tr., p.110, Ls.6-13.)
The district court indicated that it would not allow Fortin to call Waters
simply to introduce evidence that she had head Shaylor and/or Smith discussing
their trial testimony, unless Fortin could substantiate his claim that Waters had
actually been tainted as a potential witness to Fortin's detriment. (5/19/10 Tr.,
p.103, L.7

p.113, L.17.)

Fortin then attempted to theorize an alternative basis

to call Waters as a witness.

Fortin gave an offer of proof that Waters would

testify that she was at the house the night of the stabbing, she did not see Fortin

14

punch Shaylor outside the house, 3 and that after the incident, Fortin accidentally
went to Waters' car and Waters had to redirect him to his own car. 4 (5/19/10 Tr.,
p.114, L.4 - p.116, L.24.) The district court ruled this proposed evidence was
"not exculpatory," and was "cumulative," and "irrelevant."

(5/19/10 Tr., p.116,

L.25 - p.118, L.6.) The district court declined to allow Fortin to call Waters, and
the defense rested. (Id.; 5/19/10 Tr., p.119, Ls.1-4.)
On appeal, Fortin raises additional justifications for the admission of
Waters' testimony.

Fortin argues that because some of the state witnesses'

testimony was inconsistent regarding the events of the night of the stabbing,
Waters' own account could not possibly be needlessly cumulative. (Appellant's
brief, pp.18-21.) Fortin also asserts that Waters would have testified that she did
not see Fortin stab Shaylor outside the house. (Appellant's brief, p.19.)
This Court should not consider any of Fortin's additional justifications for
Waters' testimony beyond what was presented to the district court in Fortin's

3

When the district court inquired as to whether Waters may simply not have
been in a position to see Fortin punch Shaylor outside the house, or whether
Shaylor was in position to see a punch had it occurred, Fortin acknowledged that
"I believe her testimony was, to me, that she didn't see him throw a punch, but
maybe it could have happened." (5/19/10 Tr., p.115, Ls.5-11.) The court relied,
in part, on this distinction in excluding the evidence. (5/19/10 Tr., p.117, Ls.414.) It is possible, from this context, and the weight the court appears to have
put on this distinction, that the district court construed the proposed evidence that
"Waters didn't see Fortin punch Shaylor outside," as "Waters didn't see Fortin
stab Shaylor outside."
4

In his appellant's brief, Fortin explains that this evidence was relevant because
the jury heard testimony that Fortin approached Candice's car after the stabbing,
and "they could have been left with the impression that Mr. Fortin was trying to
attack Candice as well," if not for Waters' testimony that Fortin approaching
Waters' car was merely an accident. (Appellant's brief, p.20.)
15

offer of proof. The district court did not consider such additional justifications in
precluding Waters' testimony.

Instead, Fortin offered the district court only

unspecified accusations of witness taint, and irrelevant or cumulative evidence.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this testimony.
Fortin further contends that the district court erred in requiring him to
present an offer of proof for Waters' testimony in the first place, contending that
"that is what the trial is for." (Appellant's brief, p.20.) Fortin offers no authority or
additional argument to support the claim that the district court may never require
a party to make an offer of proof before calling a witness.
To the contrary, the Idaho Rules of Evidence grant district courts the
authority to manage a trial, and to prevent trials from becoming embroiled in
collateral matters. I.R.E. 403, 611 (a); see also State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 41,
752 P.2d 632, 643 (Ct. App. 1988) (Burnett, J., specially concurring). In light of
the circumstances surrounding Fortin's attempt to call Waters as a witness in this
case, it was within the court's discretion to require Fortin to present an offer of
proof as to the content of Waters' testimony. The circumstances suggest that
Fortin's purpose in attempting to call Waters as a witness was to then argue that
Waters' testimony had been "tainted." Such an argument would have been both
illogical, and unfairly prejudicial to the state. Fortin has not been able to explain,
either below or on appeal, how Shaylor's and Smith's apparent discussion of
their trial testimony could have possibly "tainted" Waters' proposed testimony to
Fortin's determinant.

In fact, Fortin argues on appeal that Waters' proposed

testimony would have been "favorable to the defense." (Appellant's brief, p.20).
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The district court acted within its discretion in requiring Fortin to give an
offer of proof that Waters would either provide some substance to a legitimate
"witness taint" claim, or at least provide evidence relevant to the case.

Fortin

provided neither, and the district court acted within its discretion to exclude the
testimony.

D.

Any Error In Excluding Waters' Testimony Was Harmless
Where an error concerns evidence improperly excluded at trial, the test for

harmless error is whether there is a reasonable probably that the lack of the
excluded evidence contributed to the verdict. State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191,
197, 16 P.3d 288, 294 (Ct. App. 2000).

In this case, even if the district court

erred in excluding Waters' testimony, there is no reasonable probability that such
error contributed to the verdict.
The evidence at trial was overwhelming that Fortin twice stabbed Shaylor
with a knife at the Boise residence, and suffered significant injuries.

The

attending trauma surgeon testified and described Shaylor's injuries as being
caused by puncture wounds consistent with a stabbing by knife, and inconsistent
with an accidental fall against a desk or entertainment center.

(5/18/10 Tr.,

p.162, L.7- p.171, L.14.) While the testimony of the state's witnesses regarding
who saw what, and who,

if anyone, was using alcohol, marijuana, or

metharnphetamine the night of the stabbing was not entirely consistent, there is
overwhelming evidence that Fortin, and Fortin alone, stabbed Shaylor both in the
chest, and face. Multiple witnesses described the altercation between Fortin and
17

Shaylor (5/17/10 Tr., p.10, L.8 - p.19, L.12; p.53, L.20 - p.59, L.17; 5/18/10 Tr.,
p.38, L.9 - p.48, L.23; p.72, L.24 - p.79, L.15; p.104, L.12 - p.110, L.12), and
none testified that anyone else was physically involved in the confrontation. The
district court did not instruct the jury on self-defense, and presumably, Fortin did
not request such an instruction. (5/19/10 Tr., p.119, L.8 - p.129, L.9.) There is
no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Fortin if Waters had
testified that she did not see Fortin punch or stab Shaylor outside the house, or if
Fortin were permitted to argue that this testimony was somehow "tainted" by
Shaylor and Smith. Any district court error in excluding Waters' testimony is thus
harmless.

111.
Fortin Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion For A
Mistrial
A.

Introduction
Fortin contends that the district court erred in dismissing his motion for a

mistrial after state witness Darryl Shaylor referenced Fortin's gang affiliation on
cross-examination.

(Appellant's brief, pp.21-24.)

A review of the record,

however, reveals that Shaylor simply gave a responsive answer to a question
posed by Fortin's defense counsel, and that no pretrial court order precluded
such a reference or ordered the state to admonish witnesses to avoid such
references. Further, the fleeting and isolated reference was not so egregious as
to require a mistrial.
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B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for mistrial, the

question on appeal is not whether the district court reasonably exercised its
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made.
State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 197, 16 P.3d 288, 294 (Ct. App. 2000). The
question is whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial
represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.

Id.

Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the abuse
of discretion standard is a misnomer.

kl

The district court's refusal to declare a

mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted
reversible error. Id.

C.

The District Court Did Not Err In Denying Fortin's Motion For A Mistrial
During the defense's cross-examination of the victim, Darryl Shaylor, the

following exchange occurred:

Q:

Now, at some point, I assume - did you ever get a clear look
at this knife? It seems you like - you just say it was a shiny
object.

A:

Not a clear look, but I believe getting cut across the face and
stabbed in the neck and seeing a shine, you know it's a
knife.

Q:

So it's just your opinion that this was a knife?

A:

I knew it was a knife. I couldn't determine which kind.

Q:

How do you know it was a knife?

A:

Because it punctured me in the neck and cut me across the
face, and I know most gang members carry those.
19

(5/17/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.12-24.)
The district court immediately instructed the jury to disregard Shaylor's
reference to gang members. (5/17/10 Tr., p.31, Ls.2-4.) Shaylor completed his
testimony, and at the next break in the trial proceedings, Fortin moved for a
mistrial,

arguing that Shaylor's

reference

inflammatory for a curative instruction."

to gang members was

"too

(5/17/10 Tr., p.41, L.9- p.44, L.13.)

Fortin expressly acknowledged that the state did not plant or otherwise invite the
comment from Shaylor. (5/17/10 Tr., p.46, Ls.9-14.)
The district court denied the motion for a mistrial. (5/17/10 Tr., p.46, L.15
- p.48, L.7.)

The court recognized that there had been no motion in limine

requesting a pretrial order instructing the state to admonish witnesses from
referencing gang membership regardless of the questions they were asked.
(5/17/10 Tr., p.42, Ls.1-5; p.46, L.25

p.47, L.4.) Further, the court recognized

that Fortin's open-ended cross-examination question, "how do you know it was a
knife?" invited any range of responses from Shaylor, not all necessarily beneficial
to Fortin's defense. The court explained:
In my view and my opinion, if you ask an open-ended question on
cross-examination such as how or why, the witness is entitled to tell
you how, and if that's on his mind, why you've got it. If there's
something in that explanation that you want to build a fence around
it, then, either, A, ask precise questions, or, B, you have to alert in
advance with a motion in limine.
(5/17/10 Tr., p.47, Ls.16-22.)
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The district court further indicated that it would entertain a request for
additional jury instruction regarding the gang reference, but Fortin declined to
make such a request. (5/17/10 Tr., p.48, Ls.1-10.)
The district court's analysis was correct.

Fortin's cross-examination

question was open-ended and invited a wide range of possible responses from
Shaylor. Without any pretrial order requiring the state to admonish witnesses not
to include references to gang membership in their answers regardless of the
questions they are asked, defense counsel opens the door to potentially
prejudicial topics with such questions. A district court is not required to grant a
motion for a mistrial in such circumstances.
The prosecutor did state to the district court he was "pretty sure" that prior
to trial, he advised Shaylor that gang membership or activity was "not to be
mentioned unless you're asked a question that calls for it, and that you cannot lie
if asked a question." (5/17/10 Tr., p.45, Ls.13-17.) On appeal, Fortin argues that
this comment reveals that Shaylor's reference to gangs was not a "valid answer
based on stream of consciousness thinking," but was an intentional act by
Shaylor to "tak[eJ advantage of the open ended question to inject prejudicial
information to the jury." (Appellant's brief, p.23.)
Even if it could be assumed that Shaylor was so savvy, Fortin's logic is
flawed.

Shaylor admitted that he did not get a "clear look" at the knife, but

believed it to be a knife because he had been stabbed and cut across the face
with it. (5/17/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.12-17.)

The response was not satisfactory to

Fortin's counsel, who pressed Shaylor on the issue and again asked him how he
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knew that it was a knife. (5/17/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.18-21.) Only then did Shaylor
offer an additional, responsive answer, that he knew "most gang members carry
those." (5/17/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.21-24.) Despite Fortin's contention on appeal, it is
reasonable for someone who has experienced the infliction of a puncture wound
at the hands a member of a group known to carry knives, to believe that he was
in fact, stabbed with a knife, as opposed to some other object.
Further, Fortin's reference to Shaylor's apparent gang membership was
not so egregious as to constitute "reversible error" and require a mistrial. The
comment was brief, and constituted an isolated incident.

Shaylor provided no

basis for how he might have known Fortin was associated with a gang. Such
evidence was thus less prejudicial then if, for example, a police officer
affirmatively testified that the defendant was, in fact, a gang member. The district
court immediately instructed the jury to disregard Shaylor's comment (5/17/10
Tr., p.31, Ls.2-4), and "[e]rror in the admission of evidence may be cured by
proper instruction, and it must be presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court's
direction to disregard entirely the objectional testimony." State v. Boothe, 103
Idaho 187, 646 P.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1982).
Because Shaylor gave a responsive answer to Fortin's open-ended crossexamination question, no pretrial order prohibited such an answer, and because
Shaylor's reference to Fortin's gang affiliation was brief and immediately stricken
by the district court, Fortin has failed to show that the reference represented
reversible error requiring the district court to declare a mistrial.
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IV.
Fortin Has Failed To Show That There Was More Than One Preserved Error To
Cumulate

Fortin finally contends that errors in his trial constituted cumulative error.
(Appellant's

brief,

pp.24-25.)

Under

the

cumulative

error

doctrine,

an

accumulation of irregularities, each of which in itself might be harmless, may in
the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho
27, 32, 803 P.2d 528, 533 (1990). However, because Fortin has failed to show
error, much less multiple errors, this doctrine is inapplicable.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Fortin's conviction for
aggravated battery and the deadly weapon sentencing enhancement.
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